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Although hazardous waste is one of the nation's most serious problems,
neither the states nor the federal government has developed an optimal
solution. Current hazardous waste laws and management practices are
based on two misguided notions: that sustained hazardous waste produc-
tion is inevitable, and that disposal-oriented technology is a panacea for
hazardous waste problems and therefore should be the focus of legal and
scientific attention. Several states have begun to reject these assumptions
and have enacted laws encouraging reduction, reuse, and recycling. No
state, however, has enacted a set of laws that sufficiently encourages this
practice of waste reduction, or "source reduction," as a viable competitor
to the disposal approach to hazardous waste management.
This Note analyzes the inadequacy of current approaches and proposes
a model legislative package for managing hazardous waste based on re-
duction, reuse, and recycling.' The proposal is addressed primarily to
those state and federal legislators and environmental protection agency
staff who have discovered that current disposal-oriented hazardous waste
management practices-even those at the forefront of modern day technol-
ogy-have failed to protect society adequately from the very substantial
costs of hazardous waste production. This Note offers an alternative ap-
proach and invites debate on what is a more effective solution for coping
with the problem of hazardous waste.
1. This Note focuses solely on management of hazardous waste as distinct from nonhazardous
solid waste. Although parallels may be drawn between the two, they often present wholly distinct
problems and technologies, and are almost universally treated separately for purposes of regulation.
For articles discussing recycling of nonhazardous waste, see Zalob, Current Legislation and Practice
of Compulsory Recycling: An International Perspective, 19 NAT. RESOURCES J. 611 (1979); Hal-
gren, Recycling and Resource Recovery: State and Municipal Legal Impediments, 7 CoLuM. J.
ENVTL. L. 1 (1980); Note, Conserving Natural Resources: Toward a Comprehensive State Solid
Waste Recycling Program Under the Federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 10 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 469 (1980-81).
For descriptions of the processes of reduction, reuse, and recycling in the context of hazardous
waste, see infra text accompanying note 47; notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
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I. CURRENT EFFORTS TO ATTACK THE HAZARDOUS WASTE
PROBLEM
The proliferation of abandoned and leaking hazardous waste sites,2 the
widespread violations at operating landfills,8 and the possibly unavoid-
able4 and irrevocable contamination of ground and drinking water5 have
led to public concern that cuts across political and social lines. Despite
increased attention to the risks of hazardous waste, government responses
to date have been at best only partially effective.6
A. Current Emphasis on Waste Production and Disposal
The federal government has responded to the problem of hazardous
waste production and disposal with the Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act of 1976 (RCRA)7 and the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA).8 Federal
and state agencies have used these two statutes almost exclusively to track
hazardous waste from cradle (generator) to grave (landfill) and to fund
landfill cleanup.' Although RCRA contains provisions encouraging re-
2. As of September 1984, there were 18,900 uncontrolled hazardous waste sites in the Environ-
mental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Emergency and Remedial Response Information System, 538 of
which are on the National Priority List. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, SUPERFUND STRAT-
EGY 64 (1985) [hereinafter cited as SUPERFUND STRATEGY]. "Still more uncontrolled sites are beingdiscovered, and probably some are being created by current practices and exemptions." OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TECHNOLOGIES AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES FOR HAZARDOUS
WASTE CONTROL 6 (1983) [hereinafter cited as TECHNOLOGIES AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES].
3. See infra text accompanying note 38.
4. "[Ljandfills inhibit releases through containment but will eventually (and usually gradually)
leak and may contaminate ground water." TECHNOLOGIES AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES, supra
note 2, at 14.
5. An unreleased EPA study reports that 29 percent of underground drinking water supplies for954 cities are contaminated. Scientists believe that dissolving and percolation (leaching) of toxic chem-
icals from landfills is a contributing factor in each case. See TECHNOLOGIES AND MANAGEMENT
STRATEGIES, supra note 2, at 5 (citing ENGINEERING TIMES, Sept. 1982). In 1982, EPA stated that
of 418 uncontrolled hazardous waste sites in the nation requiring priority attention, 347 posed direct
threats to drinking water supplies. Id. (citing Washington Post, Dec. 21, 1982, at A2, col. 1). OTA
considers such threats to the public "substantial." Id. at 4.
6. See, e.g., SUPERFUND STRATEGY, supra note 2, at 3 (Superfund remedial cleanups tend to be
impermanent with some sites deteriorating following cleanup).
7. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6991i (West
1983 & Supp. 1985)). See infra note 9.
8. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982)).
See infra note 9.
9. The RCRA "cradle to grave" system consists of: the identification and listing of hazardous
waste; a manifest system (a filing system) used to track waste; management standards and a permit
system for treatment, storage, and disposal facilities; and 30-year post-closure (post-operational) re-
quirements. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6991i (West 1983 & Supp. 1985).
CERCLA, or "Superfund," provides for emergency response and cleanup in the event of a
threatened or actual release from a hazardous waste site. CERCLA imposes strict liability on genera-
tors, transporters, and past and present owners or operators of hazardous waste facilities for the cost
of remedial action and damage to natural resources, but not for pollution victim compensation. 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982).
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cycling,10 in practice there has been little or no federal effort to recycle
hazardous waste.
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In fact, neither statute contains extensive incentives for generators to
produce less waste.12 For instance, CERCLA funds its Superfund landfill
cleanup program through the collection of a tax on the production of pe-
troleum feedstocks and specialized chemicals 3-substances that only indi-
rectly and to different degrees lead to hazardous waste generation."' As a
result, many companies that generate hazardous waste do not now pay the
Superfund tax.15 Therefore, the tax does not influence these generators to
reduce waste or to use alternatives to land disposal.18
10. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6902 (1982) (an objective of Act to promote research and application of
resource recovery); §§ 6951-6956 (Commerce Department to develop specifications and markets for
recovered material); § 6981 (EPA to research markets and systems for recovering materials); § 6983
(EPA to evaluate methods for solid waste reduction and coordinate information on resource conserva-
tion); § 6985 (EPA to conduct studies and make recommendations on incentives, policies, and actions
to reduce waste generation or encourage recycling of solid waste).
11. "The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ...has failed to promote either resource
conservation or recovery." CONFERENCE ON ALTERNATIVE STATE AND LOCAL POLICIES, THE Tox-
ICS CRISIS: WHAT THE STATES SHOULD Do 3 (J. Tryens ed. 1983). "Only about 10 percent [or $4.4
million] of EPA's current R & D efforts for hazardous waste [were] devoted to alternatives to land
disposal" in fiscal year 1983. TECHNOLOGIES AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES, supra note 2, at 16,
30. Ten years of such funding would be sufficient to clean up only several major uncontrolled (unreg-
ulated and leaking) waste sites. Id. at 30. Practically all of the RCRA provisions encouraging the
recycling of solid waste, although technically capable of being applied to hazardous waste, have been
applied solely to nonhazardous solid waste. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6903(5), (27) (hazardous waste defined
as subset of solid waste). "[Tlhe emphasis in RCRA is not on reducing waste generation but on
management of waste [sic] once they are generated, and EPA has not generally pursued the resource
recovery aspects of RCRA." TECHNOLOGIES AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES, supra note 2, at 11;
accord Telephone interview with Dr. Joel S. Hirschhorn, Senior Associate at the Congressional Of-
fice of Technology Assessment (Dec. 18, 1984). Despite EPA claims that waste reduction is its most
favored strategy, 41 Fed. Reg. 35,050-51 (1976), it clearly is "not first priority" at EPA. Telephone
interview with professional staff member, EPA (Nov. 15, 1984); see also infra note 27.
12. The current regulatory structure does not directly encourage safer and more permanent solu-
tions than land disposal, but instead provides indirect disincentives for such alternatives. TECHNOLO-
GIES AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES, supra note 2, at 16. These disincentives include the absence of
financial responsibility requirements for corrective action if hazardous waste is released from an oper-
ating landfill, id., and the 30-year limitation for post-closure requirements at land disposal sites, 40
C.F.R. §§ 264.117, 265.117 (1985), when 500 years may be realistic as a period of concern about
hazardous wastes in landfills. NAT'L MATERIALS ADVISORY BD., MANAGEMENT OF HAZARDOUS
INDUSTRIAL WASTES: RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT NEEDS 6 (1983) [hereinafter cited as NMAB
REPORT]. But see EPA Interim Final Rules Applicable to Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, and
Disposal Facilities, 47 Fed. Reg. 32,279-80 (1982) (discussing drawbacks to financial responsibility
requirements).
Conversely, increasing costs of waste management, due partially to federal hazardous waste regula-
tory programs, have indirectly provided incentives for waste reduction. "The indirect approach, how-
ever, does not appear to produce positive results extensive enough and fast enough to substantially
impact national waste management practices." TECHNOLOGIES AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES,
supra note 2, at 74.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 9631.
14. See TECHNOLOGIES AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES, supra note 2, at 75.
15. Hirschhorn, Hazardous Waste Source Reduction and a Waste-end Superjund Tax, in MAS-
SACHUSErs HAZARDOUS WASTE SOURCE REDUCTION CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 36, 38 (R.
Clark ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as 1983 MASSACHUSETTS CONFERENCE] (available from Massa-
chusetts Department of Environmental Management).
16. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, STATE EXPERIENCES WITH TAXES ON GENERATORS OR
Hazardous Waste Management
RCRA, like CERCLA, does not emphasize waste reduction, but fo-
cuses on the management of hazardous wastes once they have been gener-
ated. EPA has not only failed to pursue the resource recovery aspects of
RCRA,'17 but through regulatory policies, has created disincentives for
waste reduction. For example, EPA has kept the costs associated with
landfilling low, thereby not reflecting long-term cleanup costs and thus
the true costs of disposal. 8 Such undervaluation of land disposal costs
provides a direct incentive for land disposal and a corresponding indirect
disincentive for the development of alternatives. 9
DISPOSERS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE 2 (1984) [hereinafter cited as GAO REPORT]. In the long run,however, fear of future liability for hazardous waste releases from land disposal sites under CERCLA
may influence some generators to develop alternative methods. See TECHNOLOGIES AND MANAGE-
MENT STRATEGIES, supra note 2, at 16, 76; Hirschhorn, Federal Policies and Reduction of Hazard-
ous Wastes, in POLLUTION TO PROFIT: REDUCING INDUSTRIAL WASTE IN ILLINOIS, PROCEEDINGS
OF THE WASTE REDUCITION CONFERENCE 141, 143 (Illinois Department of Energy and Natural
Resources ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as ILLINOIS CONFERENCE].
17. See supra note 11.
18. The average cost of disposing hazardous waste under RCRA regulations is about $90 per ton.
The cost to clean up improperly disposed waste, however, is $2000 per ton, and site cleanup costs may
reach 30 million dollars per site. See TECHNOLOGIES AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES, supra note 2,
at 6, 20; SUPERFUND STRATEGY, supra note 2, at 61 (updating TECHNOLOGIES AND MANAGEMENT
STRATEGIES, supra, estimates). In the case of Love Canal, it would have cost $2 million (in 1979dollars) to dispose of the waste under current standards. The cost of remedial action, however, is
expected to exceed $100 million, and legal claims for damages total approximately 52 billion. TECH-
NOLOGIES AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES, supra, at 6. As it currently stands, "[h]azardous wastegenerators . . . would not find in their own account books the social costs of leaky landfills, highway
spills, years-delayed health impacts, and so on, and would therefore underestimate the cost to society
of the waste they produce." O'Hare, Governments and Source Reduction of Hazardous Waste, 1
HAZARDOUS WASTE 443, 445 (1984).
19. RCRA regulations provide other disincentives for the development of alternatives such as re-
cycling. For example, the regulations classify most materials to be recycled as "hazardous waste," 40C.F.R. §§ 261.2-.3 (1985), subjecting them to manifest requirements used to track hazardous wastefrom origin to disposal. See, e.g., id. §§ 261.6, 266.21-.23; 50 Fed. Reg. 643 (1985). With the enact-
ment of the RCRA amendments, even many small quantity generators who were formerly unregu-lated now fall under this provision of the regulations. Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, § 221, 98 Stat. 3221, 3248 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 6921 (West Supp.1985)) [hereinafter cited as HSWA]. Generators who might otherwise have sold recyclable waste are
thus deterred, because in the event of an accident after sale, EPA can track the waste back to thegenerator through the manifest and impose liability under CERCLA at any indefinite future time. As
the regulations define material to be recycled as hazardous only up to the point at which the recyclingprocess is complete, 50 Fed. Reg. 633 (1985), many larger firms that can afford it process their
recyclables in-house. These larger generators, unlike their smaller counterparts, are thereby able to
avoid the risks associated with third parties handling manifested hazardous waste for which the gener-
ators may be held liable. Telephone interview with Barry Garelick, Regulatory Analyst at EPA (Dec.19, 1984); see also Garelick, When is a Waste Not a Waste, THE ENVIRONMENTAL FORUM, Sept.1985, at 26, 31-32 (published by the Environmental Law Institute).
The subjection of resource recovery facilities to strict permit and standard requirements identical to
requirements for any treatment facility creates another disincentive to recycling under current law.See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.6, 264.1-.199, 265.1-199, 265.370-.406, 266.20-.70, 270.1-.74 (1985);50 Fed. Reg. 643, 665-67 (1985). Also, some generators may decide not to recycle because of prohibi-
tive costs associated with "delisting" recycling residues-a procedure necessary to dispose more
cheaply of the residues as non-hazardous solid wastes. Hirschhorn, supra note 16, at 143.
RCRA, however, does provide limited incentives for waste reduction. In particular, as RCRA hasbecome more fully implemented, waste management costs have increased substantially, providing a
motivation for waste reduction. TECHNOLOGIES AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES, supra note 2, at
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Furthermore, the amendments to RCRA enacted in November 1984,0
which declare a national policy of waste reduction"1 and give EPA au-
thority to restrict landfilling,22 are insufficient to encourage reduction, re-
use, and recycling because they provide no positive incentives for these
practices. Although the landfill restrictions, assuming EPA actually imple-
ments them, may create new supplies of reusable waste by making availa-
ble quantities of hazardous waste previously placed in landfills,
2 3 the
amendments fail to encourage the development of markets for the waste.
4
More importantly, the amendments provide no inducements for the devel-
opment or use of optimal waste minimization techniques in lieu of compa-
rably less desirable post-production technologies, such as ocean dumping,
incineration, or chemical treatment."5 Unless the new national policy
spurs additional legislation on waste reduction, the federal solution will
remain aimed almost entirely at containing or removing hazardous waste
after production and disposal.
B. Problems With the Current Approach
There are serious limitations to the current federal approach to hazard-
ous waste, which relies primarily on waste management and disposal in-
16; Hirschhorn, supra note 16, at 142, 143. If the program becomes more stringent, comprehensive,
and better enforced, these incentives are likely to increase. See id. at 143. Conversely, if enforcement
remains inadequate, and the RORA regulations remain insufficient to protect public health and the
environment, as their critics charge, waste generators and managers will continue to pay less than the
full cost of hazardous waste generation. See id. at 142.
20. See HSWA, supra note 19, at §§ 1-704.
21. Id. at § 101(b). "National Policy-The Congress hereby declares it to be the national policy
of the United States that, wherever feasible, the generation of hazardous waste is to be reduced or
eliminated as expeditiously as possible." Id. This is to be accomplished "by encouraging process sub-
stitution, materials recovery, properly conducted recycling and reuse, and treatment. . . ." Id.
22. Id. at § 201(a). Section 201(a)(d)-(a)(g) prohibits land disposal of federally listed hazardous
waste unless EPA determines that protection of human health and the environment does not require
such a prohibition. These determinations are to be made on a schedule beginning in 1986 and span-
ning several more years. Id. The Act allows EPA extensions for making these decisions. Id. at §
201(a)(h); see Skinner, Banning Waste From Land Disposal, at 3, in papers presented by EPA at the
First Public Briefing on the 1984 Amendments to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,
Video Teleconference (Dec. 11, 1984).
23. See infra notes 24, 46.
24. Supplies will be created from the waste that was previously landfilled, but the amendments do
not provide for the fate of this supply. Also, EPA has discretion in imposing the landfill ban, see, e.g.,
HSWA, supra note 19, at § 201(a)(d), and there is a distinct possibility that, if implemented at all, it
will take years for the amendments to be effective. Telephone interview with Dr. Joel S. Hirschhorn,
supra note 11.
25. These less desirable technologies have environmental costs. Incineration, for example, contrib-
utes to toxic air pollution. Despite these facts, special interest groups in Washington are discussing
ways to circumvent the amendments' disposal restrictions, specifically by finding new loopholes in the
regulations, and by resorting to other controversial disposal methods such as ocean dumping and
exporting of hazardous waste. Telephone interview with Dr. Joel S. Hirschhorn, supra note 11; cf
UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, THE STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT 1983: SE-
LECTED Topics 9 (1983) (developing countries vulnerable to hazardous waste exports).
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stead of waste reduction.28 First, the approach rests on an assumption that
safe methods exist to contain hazardous waste on land, and that there are
technical solutions once contamination of the environment has occurred. 27
Scientific studies suggest that this assumption is unwarranted. In fact,
"[t]he weight of scientific evidence indicates that land disposal of hazard-
ous waste will sooner or later jeopardize public health."2 Even state-of-
the-art land disposal facilities will eventually leak and possibly contami-
nate groundwater during the decades or centuries that some hazardous
chemicals remain dangerous.2 9
Second, the system overlooks future unknown costs for the immediate
benefit of disposal. By minimizing present waste management costs,
greater costs associated with cleanup are postponed to the future and may
be shifted away from the private to the public sector,30 technical cleanup
problems are compounded,31 and irreparable damage, such as contamina-
tion of major groundwater supplies, may arise.3 2 As generators do not
26. Land disposal is used for 80 percent of federally regulated hazardous waste, or 30 million tonsper year. See TECHNOLOGIES AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES, supra note 2, at 5. An even greaterpercentage of the 255 million to 275 million tons of hazardous waste under federal and state regula-
tion may be disposed on land. Id. Much of this waste is treatable or recyclable. Id. at 15.27. EPA apparently has not adopted a consistent position on the validity of this assumption, as
evidenced by constantly shifting official statements on the matter. Compare Huisingh, The Opportu-
nity, Challenge and Obligation of Making Pollution Prevention Pay in North Carolina, in 1983MASSACHUSETTS CONFERENCE, supra note 15, at 11 ("Landfilling represents the lowest risk option
currently available for dealing with the large quantity of hazardous waste generated each year....")(quoting Ann Gorsuch, EPA Administrator, July, 1981) with 47 Fed. Reg. 32,285 (1982) ("[A]nyliner will begin to leak eventually.") and 46 Fed. Reg. 11,128 (1981) ("There is good . . . evidence
that the hazardous constituents. . . placed in land disposal facilities very likely will migrate. . . intothe broader environment . . . . [I]n most cases, even with the application of the best available landdisposal technology, it will occur eventually."). Ironically, throughout the period these statements
were made, EPA claimed that waste reduction was its most favored strategy. See supra note 11.28. Huisingh, supra note 27, at 11 (citing Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wild-life Conservation and the Environment and the Subcomm. on Oceanography and the Comm. onMerchant Marine and Fisheries on Hazardous Waste Disposal-H.R. 1700, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.13 (1983) (statement of William Sanjour, Chief of Hazardous Waste Implementation Branch, EPA);Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Reauthorization: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Com-
merce, Transportation, and Tourism of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 2dSess. 60, 62, 69, 72 (1983) (statement of P.M. Montague, Project Administrator of the Hazardous
Waste Research Program, School of Engineering/Applied Sciences, Princeton University)).
29. Id.
30. See TECHNOLOGIES AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES, supra note 2, at 5, 12, 16. It is unclear
what these future costs will be or when they will be incurred. Indeed, due to the chemical stability of
some hazardous waste, with some substances remaining toxic for centuries, the risks could easily be
transferred to future generations. See NMAB REPORT, supra note 12, at 7; SUPERFUND STRATEGY,
supra note 2, at 3. Because neither CERCLA nor RCRA provides compensation to pollution victimsin most circumstances, see Note, The Inapplicability of Traditional Tort Analysis to Environmental
Risks: The Example of Toxic Waste Pollution Victim Compensation, 35 STAN. L. REV. 575, 596-600(1983), and common law may not provide relief, id. at 575, the victims will'most likely bear these
costs. But see 42 U.S.C. § 96110) (1982) (providing compensation from CERCLA's Post-closureLiability Fund for "injury or loss" resulting from release of hazardous substances from facilities meet-
ing RCRA closure requirements).
31. See TECHNOLOGIES AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES, supra note 2, at 58.
32. Id.
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bear the true costs of waste management,33 the cost of products whose
manufacture generates hazardous waste is artificially low, reducing the
pressure that market forces would otherwise exert toward less costly
substitutes.
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Third, there are practical and political limits to disposal as evidenced
by the difficulties experienced in siting treatment facilities and landfills.
Communities are almost universally opposed to placing any hazardous
waste facility in their own neighborhoods.3 5 The Office of Technology
Assessment attributes this opposition to health and safety concerns, fear of
economic losses, and the perception that industry and government cannot
prevent adverse consequences.3" Past experience suggests that these fears
are justified.3 7
Fourth, EPA's failure to remedy widespread lack of compliance with
RORA and the exceedingly high costs of CEROLA remedial action bring
into question the viability of current regulatory programs. For instance,
the General Accounting Office has estimated that in some states, 78% of
hazardous waste facilities were out of compliance with RORA landfill
regulations in 1 9 8 3 .11 Correspondingly, the Office of Technology Assess-
ment has estimated that to clean up approximately 10,000 of the presently
known uncontrolled hazardous waste sites will cost the nation several
hundred billion dollars, as compared with the $1.6 billion that was col-
lected under CERCLA for this purpose through 1985."9
Finally, in some instances treatment and disposal costs to industry are
higher than the costs associated with alternative methods.4 Many times a
33. See supra note 30.
34. See TECHNOLOGIES AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES, supra note 2, at 58. The authors state
two reasons for fully internalizing waste management costs:
First, on the basis of equity, it is proper that those persons most responsible for waste genera-
tion should pay for proper management, including those choosing to consume products or use
services requiring the generation of hazardous waste. Second, if the management alternatives
most protective of the public good are to be promoted, then it is reasonable to penalize those
alternatives providing lower levels of protection.
Id.
35. Id. at 254.
36. Id.; NMAB REPORT, supra note 12, at 24.
37. See supra notes 2-6.
38. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERIM REPORT ON INSPECTION, ENFORCEMENT, AND
PERMITTING AcTIVITIES AT HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITIES 2 (1983) (survey of four states).
39. See TECHNOLOGIES AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES, supra note 2, at 6; SUPERFUND
STRATEGY, supra note 2, at 3 (updating TECHNOLOGIES AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES, supra
cost figures). Furthermore, in the five years since CERCLA's passage, little progress has been made
toward permanent cleanup of known hazardous waste sites, and cleanup at some sites has in fact
caused conditions to deteriorate. SUPERFUND STRATEGY, supra note 2, at 3, 6, 9.
40. When comparing the cost of alternatives, it is important to factor in lack of "environmental
equivalence." Under the concept of "environmental equivalence," costs must be estimated over the
entire period that a substance remains hazardous under each management alternative. This cost esti-
mation has not been made for perpetual storage. See Overcash, Implication and Procedures for Waste
Elimination of Hazardous Wastes, in MAKING POLLUTION PREVENTION PAY-EcoLOGY WITH
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change of manufacturing process or of raw materials eliminates the pro-
duction of waste materials and provides additional valuable products from
what was formerly pollution. Thus, in the long-run, waste prevention
may cost less than treatment and disposal."1 By minimizing waste through
reduction, reuse, or recycling,4 2 profit may result from lower material
costs;43 lower energy costs due to more efficient technology;44 lower waste
processing costs; 45 and avoidance of disposal, cleanup, and liability costs. 46
II. THE REDUCTION APPROACH
A. The Benefits of Reduction, Reuse, and Recycling
The reduction, reuse, and recycling approach is the best long-term solu-
tion to the problem of hazardous waste and is a companion to limited
disposal. Source reduction is based on two premises: first, that reducing
production and disposal of hazardous waste will reduce unwanted risk;
and second, that because of limited natural resources, it is unwise for a
society to dispose of everything it produces. Source reduction is an alterna-
tive to end-of-pipe treatment of hazardous waste and to perpetual storage
in or on land. It can be accomplished by both (1) modification of indus-
trial processes within a plant resulting in decreased generation of hazard-
ous waste; and (2) recycling and reuse processes that may occur on or off
the site of the particular generating plant.47
For some companies, reduction, reuse, and recycling will be economi-
cally efficient in the short run.48 And as a long-run strategy, source reduc-
ECONOMY AS POLICY 68, 70 (D. Huisingh & V. Bailey eds. 1982) [hereinafter cited as D. Huisingh& V. Bailey]; see also TECHNOLOGIES AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES, supra note 2, at 14 (costs on
basis of comparable levels of control cannot be compared).
41. See infra notes 48-49. See generally M. ROYSTON, POLLUTION PREVENTION PAYS (1979)(examining cost savings from industrial waste prevention).
42. It has been estimated that greater use of alternatives to land disposal "could increase indus-
try's near-term costs significantly, perhaps by as much as 50 to 100 percent." TECHNOLOGIES AND
MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES, supra note 2, at 6; cf. id. at 14 (land disposal is still low-cost option
under current regulations for most hazardous waste) (emphasis added); Hirschhorn, supra note 16,
at 142 (land disposal is lowest cost, most widely used waste management option). "But years ordecades from now, cleaning up a site from which there are hazardous releases, and compensating
victims, might cost 10 to 100 times the additional costs incurred today to prevent releases of hazardous
materials." TECHNOLOGIES AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES, supra note 2, at 6. Viewing the costs
of land disposal in this way employs the concept of environmental equivalence. See supra note 40.43. Easson, Process Design to Minimize Pollution Case Studies, in D. Huisingh & V. Bailey,
supra note 40, at 96.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Written comments from Dr. Joel S. Hirschhorn to author (Mar. 2, 1985); see also Dorn,Waste Exchanges. An Informational Tool for Linking Waste Generators with Users, in D. Huisingh& V. Bailey, supra note 40, at 87 (citing 1976 Arthur D. Little, Inc. study finding that 6 million
metric tons per year of materials discarded could be reused or recycled, with value estimated at about
$300 million).
47. See Overcash, supra note 40, at 68.
48. "An increasing number of case studies indicate that changes-in-production-process can reduce
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tion of hazardous waste accommodates industrial growth49 with the lowest
external costs5" and encourages technological growth.51 Thus, the current
legal challenge is to eliminate dependence on land disposal by enacting
laws that encourage the implementation of already existing and perhaps
cost-saving waste elimination technology,52 while simultaneously encour-
aging the development of new industrial processes for waste reduction. 3
B. Setting Goals and Overcoming Obstacles to Source Reduction
Legislation
Source reduction legislation should serve twin objectives. First, the leg-
islation should be based upon those policies that lead to the most effective
reduction, reuse, and recycling strategies. Second, the legislation should be
pollution levels at the same time that they raise firm profits." Runge, Positive Incentives for Pollution
Control in North Carolina: A Policy Analysis, in D. Huisingh & V. Bailey, supra note 40, at 127.
"Indeed, many firms have found purposive source reduction not only cheap but profitable as valuable
materials can be recovered from some waste streams at surprisingly low cost." O'Hare, supra note 18,
at 443 (footnote omitted). For example, in France, of 100 industrial processes studied that avoided
waste production completely, 70 percent were cheaper both to build and run than their end-of-pipe
alternative. Royston, Pollution Prevention-Philosophy, Technology and Economics, in ILLINOIS
CONFERENCE, supra note 16, at 39. Often, there are few financial obstacles to taking advantage of
opportunities for hazardous waste reduction. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A DIGEST OF THE
REPORT ON REDUCING HAZARDOUS WASTE GENERATION: AN EVALUATION AND A CALL FOR Ac-
TION 6 (1985) [hereinafter cited as NRC DIGEST]. "In some cases, waste reduction initiatives may
pay for themselves. . . ." Id. at 7. For discussion of the reasons that industry has not yet imple-
mented waste minimization on a large scale, despite its potential benefits, see infra notes 54-73 and
accompanying text.
49. For example, waste reduction efforts have saved 3M Company more than $150 million
through reduced costs for pollution control construction and operations, and from sales of products
that otherwise would have been discontinued because they were environmentally unacceptable. Susag,
U.S. Industry: Success in Waste Reduction-The 3M Experience, in ILLINOIS CONFERENCE, supra
note 16, at 82. The value of recycled byproducts, including disposal avoidance costs, at Dow Corning's
Midland, Michigan plant exceeded 58 million in 1981. Meyer, "In Every Dark Cloud. . .," in D.
Huisingh & V. Bailey, supra note 40, at 23. See generally M. CAMPBELL & W. GLENN, PROFIT
FROM POLLUTION PREVENTION: A GUIDE TO INDUSTRIAL WASTE REDUCTION & RECYCLING
(1982) (project of Pollution Probe Foundation) (documenting hundreds of instances in which firms
have profited from pollution prevention).
50. See supra note 42.
51. See TECHNOLOGIES AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES, supra note 2, at 10 (changes in
processes motivated by waste management concerns may help introduce innovative technologies);
Caldart & Ryan, Looking for Long-Term Answers: Managing Hazardous Waste Through Produc-
tion Process Change, in MASSACHUSETTS HAZARDOUS WASTE SOURCE REDUCTION CONFERENCE
PROCEEDINGS 182, 188 (R. Clark ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as 1984 MASSACHUSETTS CONFER-
ENCE] (available from Massachusetts Department of Environmental Management) (regulations going
beyond current technology result in innovative products and processes); cf Royston, supra note 41, at
79 (interpreting 1976 MIT study finding that "environmental pressure" is one of most important
forces behind industrial innovation and thus technological and economic benefits).
52. See supra notes 48-49; Hirschhorn, supra note 15, at 36 (one-quarter to one-third of hazard-
ous waste could be eliminated within next five years through any of approaches that now can be used
for source reduction); GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY, ALTERNATIVES TO THE
LAND DISPOSAL OF HAZARDOUS WASTES: AN ASSESSMENT FOR CALIFORNIA 183 (1981) (75% of
waste could be recycled, treated or destroyed).
53. See infra note 82.
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designed to overcome several obstacles responsible for the limited use of
source reduction to date.
1. Ambiguous Regulatory Programs and Priorities
The crisis-" and disposal-oriented approaches of both existing hazard-
ous waste laws and industry's response to these laws have been barriers to
source reduction. 55 Coupled with confusing, constantly changing, and
often unenforced regulations,"' these obstacles have frustrated long-term
planning for waste reduction and have reinforced dependence on
disposal.57
One aim of source reduction legislation must therefore be to design in-
centives, including the facilitation of markets, that clearly encourage in-
dustry's use of source reduction over less preferable waste management
techniques. Furthermore, the legislation should give priority to waste re-
duction over reuse and recycling.5 Only reduction directly eliminates the
production of hazardous waste and is therefore the most effective of the
three in minimizing risks to health and the environment.5 1
54. The laws are crisis-oriented to the extent that they emphasize cleanup in lieu of systematic
reduction of waste production. Industry's response has been crisis-oriented with regard to source re-
duction itself: In general, firms respond to new hazardous waste issues and regulations by implement-
ing isolated source reduction measures, when a systematic approach is required for a comprehensive
waste reduction strategy. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, REDUCING HAZARDOUS WASTE GENERA-
TION: AN EVALUATION AND A CALL FOR ACTION 23 (1985) [hereinafter cited as NRC REPORT].
55. Finkel, Economic and Regulatory Incentives for Hazardous Waste Reduction in Massachu-
setts, in 1983 MASSACHUSETTS CONFERENCE, supra note 15, at 48; see also TECHNOLOGIES AND
MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES, supra note 2, at 17 (until private sector perceives regulatory structure as
not containing bias in favor of land disposal, investment in new technologies will be limited); cf. NRC
REPORT, supra note 54, at 21 (discrepancy between true cost and current cost of land disposal must
be addressed to promote waste reduction).
56. Finkel, supra note 55, at 48; NRC DIGEST, supra note 48, at 10 ("[T]he current trend
toward stronger implementation of [RCRA] must continue if reduction efforts are to be maximized.").
57. Finkel, supra note 55, at 48; see NRC DIGEST, supra note 48, at 9 ("Industrial firms are lesslikely to make definite plans for waste reduction in the face of uncertainty."). The unpredictability of
the RCRA regulatory program delays commitments to undertake waste reduction practices and hin-
ders implementation of reduction programs already begun. NRC REPORT, supra note 54, at 32.
58. See Caldart & Ryan, supra note 51, at 187 (reduction preferable to reuse and recycling);
WORLD HEALTH ORG., MANAGEMENT OF HAZARDOUS WASTE POLICY GUIDELINES AND CODE OF
PRACTICE 3 (M. Suess & J. Huismans eds. 1983) (same). But see Patterson, Strategies for Industrial
Waste Elimination, in ILLINOIS CONFERENCE, supra note 16, at 93-94 (recycling and reuse may
offer greatest waste reduction opportunity). In turn, reuse is preferable to recycling in that prior to
reintroduction into manufacturing processes, recycling, unlike reuse, requires processing of the waste
that thereby creates a residue.
59. See NRC REPORT, supra note 54, at 13. Both reuse and recycling, if not undertaken cau-
tiously, can lead to risks from, e.g., occupational exposure or improper storage of recyclable materials.
Id.; see also Caldart & Ryan, supra note 51, at 187; 48 Fed. Reg. 14,505-07 (1983) (citing examples
of accidents involving recyclables).
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2. Feasibility Questions
Although further research is needed to demonstrate technical and eco-
nomic feasibility,60 current predictions indicate that existing technologies
for source reduction can eliminate between thirty and eighty percent of
hazardous waste entering landfills.61 Not only does source reduction ap-
pear to be technically feasible, but past accomplishments bolster the con-
clusion that reduction presently is economically viable as well. For exam-
ple, several larger waste generators are beginning to introduce waste
minimization processes. The 3M Company, for instance, has saved over
$150 million through its use of such techniques worldwide.62 Similarly,
smaller generators are now saving money by selling wastes through ex-
changes rather than paying fees for disposal.6"
Larger firms, however, are generally better equipped than their smaller
counterparts to research and implement optimal waste reduction technolo-
gies." Thus, for waste reduction strategies to be implemented on a large
scale, a source reduction program must address capital and research-and-
development needs of smaller firms.
3. Information Deficiencies
The most significant barrier to the use of source reduction could be lack
of knowledge."5 More and better information must be readily available if
industry and policy makers are to evaluate accurately the potential bene-
fits of source reduction.66 Information can also serve a critical role in dem-
onstrating to industry and the public that source reduction is feasible.
6 7 A
source reduction program, therefore, should maximize industry access to
both information and technical assistance within the constraints of shield-
ing industrial trade secrets.6"
60. NRC DIGEST, supra note 48, at 7; see also Hirschhorn, Long Term Benefits of Waste Reduc-
tion, in 1984 MASSACHUSETTS CONFERENCE, supra note 51, at 2. Hirschhorn states that while there
clearly are many R & D opportunities, attention should focus on information transfer, technical assis-
tance, and capital assistance for implementing currently available technologies. Id.
61. TECHNOLOGIES AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES, supra note 2, at 12; written comments
from Dr. Joel S. Hirschhorn to author (Mar. 2, 1985); see also supra n-te 52.
62. See supra note 49; see also supra notes 42, 48 (discussing financial costs of waste prevention).
63. See infra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
64. Runge, supra note 48, at 128.
65. See Hirschhorn, supra note 15, at 36. Six books have been written about source reduction as
compared to hundreds on techniques such as land burial or incineration. Sarokin, Source Reduction of
Hazardous and Toxic Wastes: Obstacles and Incentives, in 1983 MASSACHUSETIS CONFERENCE,
supra note 15, at 63.
66. See Dorn, supra note 46, at 92. According to the National Research Council, lack of data, as
well as the "absence of an extensive peer-reviewed literature on waste reduction," constrained its
study of the institutional factors affecting waste generation. See NRC DIGEST, supra note 48, at 2.
67. Brower, Waste Reduction-Concept to Reality, in D. Huisingh & V. Bailey, supra note 40,
at 110 (industry requires positive proof of profitability).
68. See infra note 70; infra text accompanying notes 107-09.
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4. Industry Opposition
As discussed above, industry opposition to source reduction is due in
part to unawareness that reduction is feasible for many wastes.69 It also
results from fears that autonomy and trade secrets could be jeopardized by
programs that delve into the specifics of production processes.70 Further-
more, industry opposition may emanate from risk-aversion-71-that is,
both executives and workers resist the prospect of increased near-term
costs and uncertain economic benefits,7 2 as well as change in their routin-
ized behavior.7 Because the success of a source reduction program may
depend upon industry support, legislation must address these concerns,
such as by providing incentives for voluntary waste reduction efforts and
by minimizing direct regulation.
III. THE REDUCTION PROPOSAL
Currently, only six states have enacted significant legislation on hazard-
ous waste source reduction,7 4 with no state using all the legal incentives
available. The model law advocated in this Note attempts to synthesize
the particular strengths of each state's legislation and to address the haz-
ardous waste problem through a comprehensive legislative approach. The
proposal employs both regulatory and non-regulatory mechanisms and en-
compasses four critical areas: planning, research, institutional assistance,
and statutory and regulatory adjustments.
A. Planning
Planning includes developing a guiding government policy on source
reduction and a scheme for policy implementation. Planning is necessary
to address the complexity of the hazardous waste problem and to accom-
modate regional differences and varying state resources7 5 for coping with
69. See Finkel, supra note 55, at 46; supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text; infra note 111.
70. Waste reduction gives a competitive advantage if waste management costs are a significant
fraction of production costs. NRC REPORT, supra note 54, at 25. Many firms are thus reluctant to
release information on reduction technologies. Id. The confidentiality problem varies between indus-
tries, but particularly inhibits adoption of waste reduction by small businesses, which are without the
resources to explore such opportunities individually. Id. at 25-26. This problem may be best dealt
with by the creation of centralized government programs for R & D and information dissemination.
See also infra text accompanying notes 107-08.
71. "Reduction in generation of hazardous waste may be impeded because of a tendency in indus-
try to select proven production technologies rather than alternatives that may generate less waste."
NRC DIGEST, supra note 48, at 4; see also Finkel, supra note 55, at 47 (smaller firms particularly
risk-averse).
72. NRC REPORT, supra note 54, at 23-24.
73. Id.; Finkel, supra note 55, at 47.
74. These states are California, Illinois, Minnesota, New York, North Carolina, and Washington.
For discussion of particular portions of these laws, see infra notes 76-127 and accompanying text.
75. For example, some states have no disposal sites within their borders or are dominated by
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hazardous waste. Planning also assures that waste reduction becomes a
long-run strategy.
Legislation for waste minimization planning should include provisions
that encourage source reduction by declaring it a high priority7 , and that
mandate government promotion of waste minimization technology.7 The
legislation should specify that industry implement hazardous waste man-
agement techniques in order of descending priority, with waste reduction
highest (followed by reuse and recycling), and land disposal lowest. 8
To assure implementation of these delineated priorities, the legislation
should provide that the non-regulatory agency responsible for implement-
ing the source reduction program" prepare a hazardous waste plan"
0 for
the region based on alternatives to land disposal. In setting forth source
reduction goals and recommendations on strategies to achieve these goals,
the plan can serve as a cohesive policy guide for government, and as a
demonstration to industry and the public of a new emphasis on waste
reduction."1
B. Research
Research on source reduction is necessary because source reduction is a
relatively new approach to hazardous waste management, with marketing
different industries.
76. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN §§ 70.105.150, .105.160 (Supp. 1986) ("Management and
regulation of hazardous waste disposal should encourage practices which result in the least amount of
waste being produced."); MINN. STAT. ANN §§ 115A.02, .075 (West Supp. 1986) (goal of Waste
Management Act and first priority to reduce amount of waste generated); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-
216.10(c) (Supp. 1985) (declares prevention, recycling, detoxification, and reduction as waste manage-
ment techniques that best protect human health and environment).
77. California law should be used as a model because it directly charges its implementing agency
to promote recycling, recovery, reduction, and exchange of hazardous waste. See CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 25170(h), Q) (West Supp. 1986); see also, e.g., IL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 § 1020
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985) (one purpose of title is to encourage recycling and reuse).
78. Washington law provides a particularly good model, listing reduction, recycling, treatment,
incineration, solidification, and landfilling in descending order of priority. See WASH. REV. CODE
ANN § 70.105.150 (Supp. 1986). The only apparent problem with this section is that the definitions
given for the terms "landfill" and "treatment" are somewhat ambiguous. Telephone interview with
Gerald W. Boese, Project Manager for the Hazardous Waste Section of the Washington Department
of Ecology (Aug. 13, 1984); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115A.075 (West Supp. 1986) (first priority
given to eliminating generation; disposal should be last resort).
79. See infra text accompanying notes 99-101; supra text accompanying notes 73-74.
80. Minnesota's legislation is the best model, because it mandates that the state's Waste Manage-
ment Board adopt a plan placing highest priority on alternatives to land disposal, including process
modification, recycling, reuse, and recovery. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115A.11 (West Supp. 1986).
The revised draft plan predicts a 31% reduction in the state's hazardous waste generation by the year
2000. MINN. WASTE MANAGEMENT BD., REvisED DRAFT HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT
PLAN 83 (Feb. 1984); see also N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1285-g(3) (McKinney 1982) (recycling
program to include planning).
81. Another source reduction planning strategy worth considering in comprehensive legislation is
coordination between states. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-216.13.(9) (1983) (Waste Management
Board to promote discussion with other states concerning regional hazardous waste management
agreements).
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and technological waste reduction techniques still being developed. 2 Be-
cause the high financial costs to generators of disposal have only re-
cently-and even now, only partially-been imposed, 3 generators mistak-
enly continue to believe that land disposal will remain the cheapest
management alternative. This misconception has stifled private incentives
to research source reduction, making government intervention necessary to
ensure that such research actually occurs."4
Legislation mandating research on source reduction can vest research
authority in a government agency 85 or provide for agency-administered
grants to universities and industry.8 Research efforts should be aimed ini-
tially at generating the information necessary to implement currently
available waste reduction technologies, and then-to assure that waste re-
duction continues-at developing new techniques.87 Legislation for a re-
search program"8 should therefore provide for an initial assessment of the
82. See TECHNOLOGIES AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES, supra note 2, at 9 (data needed on
alternative industrial processes for waste reduction); Clark, Source Reduction Policy Issues, in 1984
MASSACHUSETTS CONFERENCE, supra note 51, at 7 (research and development of new methods of
source reduction is necessary component for future waste reduction efforts).
83. These high costs are due primarily to RCRA regulations and CERCLA liability on the fed-
eral level, and to comparable state statutes. But as pointed out earlier, supra note 18 and accompany-
ing text, the true costs of disposal have not yet been incurred.
84. See ROYSTON, supra note 41, at 138 (financial assistance needed for research designed to
produce clean technologies); cf. Palmer, Chemical Recycling: Making it Pay, in D. Huisingh & V.
Bailey, supra note 40, at 82 (expertise needed because workers in one industry do not know how
chemicals can be used in another).
85. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25170(e) (West Supp. 1986) (Department of
Health Services to coordinate research on hazardous waste recycling and recovery); N.Y. PUB. AUTH.
LAW § 1285-g(3)(b)(ii) (McKinney 1982) (recycling program to include research into feasibility and
market potential of recovered industrial materials); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 70.105.160.(Supp.
1986) (Department of Ecology to study methods to achieve waste reduction).
86. See, e.g., infra note 125 (discussing Minnesota's program for research grants to industry).
However, "[a]lthough R & D may occur within the private sector, it will do little to advance waste
reduction efforts on a larger scale unless information is freely exchanged." Clark, supra note 82, at 7.
Because many firms are reluctant to release information, supra note 70, concentrating at least a
portion of research monies within universities appears desirable. On the other hand, while agencies
and industries tend to work toward quick results on source reduction research, university contractors
may be constrained by such factors as the academic year and the need to publish. Telephone interview
with Terry Pierson, Staff member of North Carolina Board of Science and Technology (Mar. 5,
1985). Thus a balanced approach to research, involving both universities and industry, is needed. Id.
87. See NRC REPORT, supra note 54, at 36-37 (current need to encourage adoption of existing
source reduction methods, but as more reduction occurs, new techniques will need development).
88. North Carolina, through its "Pollution Prevention Pays" program, may be the leading state in
waste reduction research. In July 1983, the state allocated $600,000 over two years to the North
Carolina Board of Science and Technology for research and technical assistance to industry.
Huisingh, The Experience and Promise of a Statewide Pollution Prevention Program, in ILLINOIS
CONFERENCE, supra note 16, at 121; Div. of Environmental Management, N.C. Dep't of Natural
Resources and Community Dev., Informational Pamphlet (discussing Pollution Prevention Pays Pro-
gram); telephone interview with Terry Pierson, Staff Member of North Carolina Board of Science
and Technology (Aug. 7, 1984). The state is also studying the feasibility of creating a research center
devoted to pollution prevention. HAZARDOUS WASTE STUDY COMM'N OF 1983, POLLUTION PREVEN-
TION-REPORT TO THE LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMISSION (report accepted by Commission on
May 17, 1984). One major strength of North Carolina's program is the ties built between industry,
government, and universities within a non-regulatory framework. See N.C. Bd. of Science and Tech-
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types and amounts of waste streams generated by industries within the
jurisdiction, 9 estimates of future waste streams,90 and an analysis of the
best methods for each industry to reduce these streams given current tech-
nology.91 Each waste should also be studied generically, to determine the
degree and type of difficulties encountered reducing or reusing particular
wastes.92
Non-regulatory, voluntary waste minimization projects will win ap-
proval by a risk-averse industry only if research efforts produce compre-
hensive feasibility studies and economic analyses.93 A thorough research
program should therefore contain technological and market research 94 on
reduction, reuse, and recycling techniques, as well as pilot projects95 to
demonstrate the feasibility of new techniques.96
C. Institutional Assistance
The third critical area within a comprehensive legislative ap-
proach-institutional assistance for source reduction-includes the crea-
tion and empowerment of governmental agencies and other institutions
charged with promoting waste minimization. Institutional assistance is in-
nology, Informational Pamphlet (discussing Pollution Prevention Research and Education Program).
See generally Huisingh, supra note 27, at 9 (discussing North Carolina program).
89. See N.Y. PUB. AuTH. LAW § 1285-g(3)(b)(iii), (iv) (McKinney 1982) (collection of data on
industrial material and methods); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-216.13.(1) (1983) (Waste Management
Board to evaluate volume, distribution, location, and characteristics of waste generated); see also
Caldart & Ryan, supra note 51, at 182 (policies should be grounded on examination of problem on
industry-by-industry basis).
90. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 § 1020.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985) (monitoring of ex-
isting and expected rates of hazardous waste production); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115A. 11 (West Supp.
1986) (plan to contain reduction targets and estimate of waste generation through year 2000).
91. Washington legislation comes closest to this objective, requiring a "study to determine the best
management practices for categories of waste" considering available technology, including methods to
achieve waste reduction. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 70.105.160 (Supp. 1986); see also MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 115A.08 Subd. 4(c) (West Supp. 1986) (requiring evaluation of all feasible and prudent
alternatives to disposal and their potential to reduce disposal); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-216.13.(2)
(1983) (Waste Management Board to recommend how to maximize resource recovery).
92. New York's requirement of rating recyclables according to "the degree of difficulty and the
kind of difficulty encountered" in recycling is innovative and should be used as a model, because it
goes beyond the usual requirement of simply listing recyclables. N.Y. PUB. AuTH. LAW § 1285-
g(3)(b)(viii) (McKinney 1982); see, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25175(a), 25176 (West
1984 & Supp. 1986) (lists shall be prepared and presented annually to legislature).
93. Brower, supra note 67, at 110.
94. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25170(g) (West 1984) (study of market potential
and feasibility of resource recovery); N.Y. PUB. AuTH. LAW § 1285-g(3)(b)(ii) (McKinney 1982)
(same).
95. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25170(1) (West 1984) (providing for pilot
projects).
96. The research program can be funded, at least in part, by a tax on generation or disposal. For
example, Washington partially funds its waste management study through a combination of such tax
proceeds, WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 70.105A.060(1) (Supp. 1986), and hazardous waste fines and
penalties, id. § 70.105.180; see also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 § 1022.2(e) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985)
(12.5% of land disposal fees used to research alternatives).
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dispensable because markets alone have failed adequately to encourage re-
duction and discourage disposal. Institutional assistance also facilitates
necessary central coordination of source reduction. For example, the ex-
pertise required to choose the most effective waste minimization strategies
for a particular plant may be too costly for each generator to develop
individually9 7 and may be obtained more efficiently by a government
body. This is particularly true for the multiple and diverse small quantity
generators, who need technical assistance on waste reduction that only a
central institution can provide. 8
A comprehensive source reduction program includes both regulatory
functions, such as enforcing disposal restrictions,9" and non-regulatory
functions, such as providing information to industry.100 To retain maxi-
mum industry support for source reduction, the legislation should provide
that these functions be separated. Authority for the program thus should
be divided between a regulatory body, such as a state Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, and a non-regulatory body, such as a government corpora-
tion. 101 In addition, an Advisory Council representing diverse interests
should report to the responsible agencies and the legislature on, for exam-
ple, suggested changes in the waste reduction program.102
97. Runge, supra note 48, at 115, 128.
98. Id.
99. See infra text accompanying notes 115-17.
100. See N.C. Bd. of Science and Technology, Informational Pamphlet, supra note 88, at 1-2
(regulatory and non-regulatory functions needed); Hickman, Industrial Waste Prevention: An Assess-
ment and Demonstration in the Region of Waterloo, Ontario, in 1984 MASSACHUSETrS CONFER-
ENCE, supra note 51, at 27 (cooperative approach and adequate regulatory framework needed). Over-
cash, supra note 40, at 69, asserts that the government role should be restricted to evaluating the
environmental ramifications of different approaches and to ensuring that maximum use is made of
waste elimination. This, however, is not an argument against regulatory controls as a complement to a
strong non-regulatory incentive structure, as regulatory controls can result in increased waste reduc-
tion. "[A] strong regulatory program is essential since it raises the costs of managing residuals and
provides an incentive for generators of waste to find ways to minimize these costs." N.C. Bd. of
Science and Technology, Informational Pamphlet, supra note 88, at 1; see also NRC DiGEST, supra
note 48, at 3 (waste reduction most likely fostered by non-regulatory methods such as information
dissemination programs and economic incentives, but regulatory standards will be strong impetus in
undertaking waste reduction efforts).
101. This structure has been effective in New York, as evidenced by support for the program by
both trade associations and environmentalists. Telephone interview with Pickett Simpson, Hazardous
Waste Program Manager for the New York Environmental Facilities Corporation (Aug. 14, 1984).
Likewise, Minnesota's Waste Management Board, with responsibility for the state's source reduction
program, is separate from the agency having regulatory authority over hazardous wastes. Decker,
Waste Reduction Programs in Minnesota, in 1984 MASSACHUSETTS CONFERENCE, supra note 51, at
30. This is not the case in California, where the Department of Health Services exercises regulatory
and non-regulatory functions. This structure assumes, most likely falsely, that industry will vigorously
undertake voluntary waste reduction projects with the help of the same government body by which it
is regulated. Thus, California's approach would not seem to encourage voluntary adoption of source
reduction to the same extent as when regulatory and non-regulatory functions are separated.
102. The Council should include members with different interests and concerns over hazardous
waste, such as representatives from business, industry, universities, environmental groups, and the
general public. See ILL. ANN. STAT. h. 111 § 1005.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985) (creates Hazardous
Waste Advisory Council with broad membership and duties). The Council can suggest administrative
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 95: 810, 1986
In order to facilitate the creation of markets for reusable waste, 03 the
legislation also should grant the non-regulatory body responsibility for a
"cpassive" waste exchange,1°" which would operate as a clearinghouse to
match up generators who have waste to sell with purchasers who can use
the waste as raw material.10 5 The government can also operate an "ac-
tive" exchange, which, unlike the "passive" model, would take physical
possession of the waste. 106 To gain industry support for the waste ex-
change, as well as for any other aspect of the source reduction program
where the confidentiality of sensitive production or waste minimization
processes could be at stake,10 7 legislation should provide strong protec-
and legislative changes as well as methods to promote reduction technologies. Id. Apparently, Illinois'
Council is responsible for the recent introduction of legislation. Telephone interview with John
Schmitt, Illinois Department of Natural Resources (July 16, 1984); see also 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws
926 (creates Hazardous Waste Study Commission).
103. The failure to provide markets for reusable waste is a distinctive shortcoming of the 1984
RCRA amendments. See supra text accompanying notes 24, 58. These markets have not developed on
their own partially because the unpredictability of the RCRA regulatory system has discouraged both
the practice of recycling and the development of recycling facilities. See NRC REPORT, supra note 54,
at 41; supra text accompanying note 56.
104. Presently, there are exchanges in at least 20 states and 12 foreign countries. Laughlin, Don't
Waste It, Exchange It, CHEMTECH, Feb. 1984, at 93, 94. Many are government-run, because broad
industry participation often requires the exchange to operate across a wide region, with hazardous
materials that have an unknown or unrecognized value. Telephone interview with John W. Rafferty,
Director of Minnesota Technical Assistance Program (Mar. 5, 1985); NRC REPORT, supra note 54,
at 40; see, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25170(k) (West 1984) (establishing "information
clearinghouse"); N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1285-g(3)(b)(vii) (McKinney 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
143B-216.13.(4) (1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.105.100 (Supp. 1986); ef. Laughlin, supra
(citing Canadian study recommending separating exchange from government, but particularly from
regulatory agencies, to protect industry participants from government "interest" and commercial
competition).
105. The success of waste exchanges vary, and the U.S. exchanges are far less successful than
many European exchanges. Patterson, Strategies for Industrial Waste Elimination, in ILLINOIS CON-
FERENCE, supra note 16, at 92. For example, New York's exchanges saved $550,000 in disposal costs
in 1982-83 by finding uses for over 2700 tons of waste. Telephone interview with Diane M. Hinch-
cliff, Executive Assistant for the New York State Environmental Facilities Corporation (Aug. 14,
1984). However, North Carolina's exchange is "floundering." Telephone interview with Terry Pier-
son, supra note 88. In addition to financial and marketing problems, the failure may be due to waste
generators' fear of future liability. Id. Although the text of the statute is ambiguous, CERCLA ap-
pears to impose continued liability on a generator in certain circumstances, for instance when the
waste is treated by the receiving user, notwithstanding that the generator has sold the waste through
an exchange. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1982) (imposing liability on those who arrange for "treat-
ment or disposal" of hazardous substances); supra note 19. See generally G. DUNN & N. GINNIS,
LIABILITY ASSOCIATED WITH WASTE EXCHANGES (1984) (report to North Carolina Governor's
Waste Management Board on liability of exchanges and of participating generators). Federal law
should thus be amended to provide that in the event of a sale through an exchange to a bona fide
purchaser, the liability for the waste is transferred to the purchaser and the original generator's liabil-
ity ceases.
106. New York's successful exchanges, see supra note 105, provide a good model for government
involvement in waste exchanges. The state, unlike most others, both aggressively runs its own active
exchange and contributes funds to a regional passive exchange that operates across several states. See
generally N.Y. STATE ENVIRONMENTAL FACILIrIEs CORP., INDUSTRIAL MATERIALS RECYCLING
ACT PROGRAM SECOND ANNUAL REPORT 2, 3-7 (1983) (describing New York's exchanges). The
administrative decision to participate in a regional exchange, rather than to create a wholly new
exchange, should depend on a state's size and waste generation patterns.
107. Examples are technical assistance and information exchange programs. See, e.g., WASH.
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tions' °8 for industry trade secrets.' 09 This may be accomplished through
nondisclosure agreements and procedures, and by penalties against pro-
gram staff for improperly and intentionally disclosing confidential
information.
However, complete information on wastes, waste economics, and source
reduction technology "is not present in most firms.""' Because of firms'
reluctance to transfer information about advantageous waste reduction
processes among themselves, it is essential that institutional assistance for
source reduction include legislation authorizing technical assistance to in-
dustry for waste minimization."' To encourage voluntary industry adop-
tion of state-of-the-art technologies, this program should be non-
regulatory and incorporate research efforts and university expertise." 2 El-
ements of a technical assistance program include workshops for specific
industries and waste streams; the development of management plans for
industrial waste streams; and on-site consultation." 3
REv. CODE ANN. § 70.105.170 (Supp. 1986) (confidentiality preserved).
108. New York legislation provides the strongest protections, including penalties against its staff
for improperly disclosing trade secrets. N.Y. Pua. AUTH. LAW § 1285-g(5) (McKinney 1982). The
law requires that confidential information, which can be used only for the purposes of the Act, not be
disseminated without the express consent of the generator who furnished it, and exempts such infor-
mation from disclosure under the state freedom of information act. Id.; see also supra note 70.
109. A comprehensive legislative package should also provide information on source reduction that
is available to the general public. For good models, see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25171
(West 1984) (public report to contain assessment of source reduction technologies); N.Y. PUB. Aura.
LAW § 1285-g(3)(b)(v), (ix) (McKinney 1982) (providing information to public and recycling hand-
book available to all industries).
110. Clark, supra note 82, at 7.
111. Technical assistance offers "real promise" of overcoming information gaps, id., and is a cor-
nerstone to a waste reduction effort. See, e.g., RoYSToN, supra note 41, at 115. Although there is
currently a "vast body" of scientific and engineering data on source reduction, there are too few
information transfer programs "nationwide," and "no federal program in this area." Hirschhorn,
supra note 16, at 144. This assistance is particularly needed for smaller companies. Id.
"fD]issemination of information on waste reduction is vital to further waste reduction efforts by in-
dustry." NRC DIGEST, supra note 48, at 5.
112. North Carolina's well-funded program, see Huisingh, supra note 27, at 29, provides an
operational model. The state's technical assistance (TA) program is integrated with research efforts
and university expertise. See supra note 88. A TA program can pay at least in part for itself. For
instance, Massachusetts' four phased technology transfer program is funded through charges to par-
ticipants, but may be hindered by unspecific enabling legislation. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D §
3 (West 1981); telephone interview with Dr. Redmond Clark, Assistant Director of the Massachusetts
Bureau of Solid Waste Disposal (Aug. 13, 1984); see also G. HUNT, W. SLOAN & R. WALTERS,
APPROACH TO TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR INDUSTRIAL AND HAZARDOUS WASTE GENERATORS
(1983) (proposing Maryland TA program with costs shared between state and participating indus-
tries). Minnesota, however, which correctly emphasizes assistance to small businesses, provides the
most comprehensive model for legislation, including outreach, information dissemination, and coordi-
nation with other programs. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115A.152 (West Supp. 1986).
113. Decker, supra note 101, at 33, 34. The program can also provide a source reduction library,
id., and encourage transfer of information between generators. Clark, supra note 82, at 7. It can be
complemented by awards to industry for outstanding achievement in waste reduction. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 143B-216.13.(8) (1983) ("Governor's Award of Excellence").
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D. Statutory and Regulatory Adjustments
Statutory and regulatory adjustments... constitute the fourth area
within a comprehensive legislative approach. Such adjustments can com-
pensate for the failure of markets sufficiently to encourage source reduc-
tion and can correct statutory and regulatory frameworks that provide few
incentives for reduction and inadequate penalties for disposal. Such ad-
justments also are necessary to reflect a new policy emphasis on waste
minimization.
For instance, although Congress gave EPA the authority to ban feder-
ally listed hazardous waste from land disposal in the recent RCRA
amendments, 15 comparable restrictions on the state level are still justified.
The states often designate many substances as hazardous that the federal
government does not. 18 There are thus many potentially dangerous
materials-from the states' view-excluded from the congressional ban.
To encourage reduction in waste generation to the lowest feasible levels, it
is appropriate to place the burden of overcoming a presumption in favor
of reduction on industry-the only party in a position actually to reduce
generation and minimize disposal. Legislation therefore should provide
that all state-listed hazardous waste is banned from land disposal unless
industry demonstrates to the responsible regulatory agency that, consider-
ing technological and economic feasibility, specific waste cannot be reason-
ably reduced, reused, recycled, incinerated, or treated, and must be
landfilled. 117
114. Statutory and regulatory "adjustments" can be contrasted with the creation of wholly new
institutional programs, such as research and technical assistance programs.
115. See supra note 22; text accompanying notes 20-25.
116. See supra note 26 (significant disparity between wastes federally regulated and total amount
regulated). State land disposal regulations are also justified because the federal ban will probably not
be implemented for many years. See supra note 24; infra note 117. In fact, the federal legislation
appears to be modeled on state law, as evidenced by the amendments' mandate for early EPA review
of a series of wastes identical to the wastes banned from land disposal in California. Compare CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25175 (West Supp. 1986) and CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, R. 82 (1984)
with HSWA, supra note 19, at § 201(a)(d) (same wastes targeted).
117. Illinois' legislation restricting liquid hazardous waste disposal takes this form, and is also
distinctive for its detailed provisions for appeals, enforcement, variances, judicial review, and penalties.
See ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 111 §§ 1022.6, 1035-1045 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985). Whether the provi-
sions are workable cannot be determined until 1987, when the legislation takes effect, but in form this
legislation serves as a comprehensive model.
Other approaches exist. For example, California has a two-prong system. It bans categories of
wastes from disposal upon an administrative finding that recycling treatment capacity is available.
CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, R. 82 (1984). Second, generators must justify why they have disposed of
recyclable waste not subject to the ban. See CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, § 25175 (West Supp.
1986). One major weakness in the application of California's law is that penalties for noncompliance,
although provided for by statute, id., have never been promulgated in the applicable regulations, or
enforced. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, R. 82 (1984); interview with Chris Wilhelm, California Depart-
ment of Health Services (July 18, 1984). Another method of encouraging recycling is to restrict dis-
posal facility development unless there are no feasible alternatives. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115A.24
(West Supp. 1986).
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A tax on disposal-a waste-end tax-should be used in tandem with
disposal restrictions, and can be designed to tax generators, or owners and
operators of hazardous waste disposal facilities, or both. " 8 By internal-
izing the true cost of land disposal within hazardous waste industries,
such a tax may be critical in encouraging the use and development of
feasible reduction techniques and in discouraging disposal.'1 9 But to have
that effect, the tax must be high enough to have an impact on those
taxed, 20 employ a variable rate according to the toxicity of the material
discarded, and if the tax is generator-based, exempt material to be reused
or recycled. 21 The proceeds may be used to fund cleanup efforts 22 as
well as the overall reduction and recycling program. 2
Neither disposal restrictions nor waste-end taxes, however, address in-
dustry's initial costs and investment uncertainties in undertaking waste
reduction. A comprehensive, positive economic incentive program for
California's system does not encourage source reduction to as great an extent as does Illinois':
California requires only a post hoc rationalization from industry after disposal of recyclable waste,
while Illinois actually prevents such disposal. Illinois' structure is also preferable to that of the new
federal restrictions promulgated in the RCRA amendments. See supra note 22. First, the criteria used
to determine whether a waste should be banned from disposal under federal law-protection of
human health and the environment-although an important goal, does little to affirmatively promote
waste minimization. Moreover, using this criteria may be a false assurance to the public, because
given current technology, any landfill will leak. See supra note 27. Furthermore, the amendments
place the discretion to make the decisions on EPA-an agency that is overburdened, known for delay,
and subject to enormous political pressure. At best, such a system invites many years of uncertainty
over the permissibility of land disposal.
118. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25174.-25174.9, 25300-25395 (West 1984 &
Supp. 1986); CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, R. 79 (1984) (taxes generators and disposal facilities); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 111 § 1022.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985) (taxes disposal facilities); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 115B.22 (West Supp. 1986) (taxes generators); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERv. LAW § 27-0923
(McKinney Supp. 1986) (taxes in-state generators and disposal facilities used for out-of-state wastes).
119. See Finkel, supra note 55, at 44, 48; TECHNOLOGIES AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES,
supra note 2, at 75-78.
120. Although a tax on waste might be instituted on the federal level, special interests may lobby
to make it so low as to have no effect. Should this be the case, escalation of public concern over the
growing Superfund problem, resulting in public pressure on industry, may actually serve the same
purpose as the tax in reducing disposal. Telephone interview with Dr. Joel S. Hirschhorn, supra note
11.
121. See, e.g., Stewart, Economics, Environment, and the Limits of Legal Control, 9 HARV.
ENVTL L. REV. 1, 16 (1985) (proposing idea of quantitative risk index for toxics as basis for control
strategies with regulatory and economic incentive components).
The states that have implemented a waste-end tax have not yet determined whether it has resulted
in more desirable waste management practices. GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 15. However, some
of these states have experienced misstatements or nonreporting of wastes by generators or disposal
facilities, misuse of exemptions, and a failure to generate anticipated revenues. Id. at 8-15.
122. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25174.1-25174.9, 25300-25395 (West 1984 &
Supp. 1986); CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, R. 79 (1984) (taxes generators and disposal facilities to fund
cleanup, inspection, and other program costs). One irony of a waste-end tax is that "[t]he more suc-
cessful the tax is in achieving its objective of encouraging more desirable waste management practices
. . . the less successful the tax will be in raising needed revenue [for landfill cleanup]." GAO RE-
PORT, supra note 16, at v.
123. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 § 1022.2(e) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985) (12.5% of re-
ceipts used for source reduction); supra note 96.
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waste reduction.. 4 is therefore needed to finance or encourage the develop-
ment of resource recovery facilities, equipment, and studies. Governments
can use bonds, grants, 25 loans, 2 ' and tax incentives I27 to encourage in-
dustry to explore the economic and technical feasibility of source reduc-
tion. The role of positive incentives is particularly pronounced where
firms are small. Positive inducements provide funding for initial capital
costs and technical expertise, which may be already available to larger
firms. This financing may be crucial in promoting firm decisions to make
waste minimization process changes that will yield overall profits. 2
E. Implementation
The four components of this legislative approach to source reduc-
tion-planning, research, institutional assistance, and statutory and regu-
latory adjustments-work as an integrated whole. While each describes a
conceptually discrete set of programs, each of the four depends on the
other three for successful implementation. For example, an institution's
effectiveness in rendering technical assistance to industry depends upon an
active research program to develop applicable technologies. The scope of
the research program in turn relies upon the particular source reduction
124. While a waste-end tax may act as a disincentive to landfilling, positive economic incentives
can reward those businesses that engage in source reduction. G. BULANOWSM, G. LAZARUS, L. MO-
RANDI & J. STEELER, A SURVEY AND ANALYSIS OF STATE POLICY OPTIONS TO ENCOURAGE AL-
TERNATIVES TO LAND DISPOSAL OF HAZARDOUS WASTE 20 (1981) (available from National Con-
ference of State Legislatures); see also Runge, supra note 48, at 127 (both positive and negative
economic incentives needed). Contra telephone interview with Bill Sloane, Secretary of Maryland
Hazardous Waste Siting Board (Aug. 8, 1984) (capital investment in reducing wastes should not be
subsidized; only waste minimization results should be rewarded).
125. Minnesota law provides grants to generators totaling $150,000 for source reduction feasibil-
ity studies. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115A.154 (West Supp. 1986). The legislation provides a good model
because it requires that the results of the studies be made available to all generators through the
state's technical assistance program, thereby helping to disseminate much needed information. This
type of grant would appeal most to smaller firms, where confidentiality may be a lesser consideration.
See supra note 111; see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115A.156 (grants for, e.g., metal and solvent
recycling facilities); supra note 86 (research by both universities and industry needed).
126. Most of the current legislation authorizes the responsible agency to finance loans for con-
struction or modification of recovery and generating facilities through the sale of tax exempt bonds.
See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 44500-44563 (West 1979) (tax exempt revenue bonds);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127 §§ 721-736 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985) (bond proceeds may be used for
process modification to reduce hazardous waste); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115A.162 (West Supp. 1986)
(loans for up to 75% of hazardous waste processing facility capital costs, exclusive of land costs); N.Y.
PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1290 (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1986) (bonds to finance 40-year unlimited
loans); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159C-6 to -7 (1982) (loans for reduction, recovery, and recycling
facilities).
127. For instance, Minnesota has a sales tax exemption for equipment used to process hazardous
waste at resource recovery facilities. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 297A.25 Subd. l(aa) (West Supp. 1986). A
comprehensive tax incentive scheme could also include credits for equipment used to reduce or recycle
waste. See, e.g., 1984 Minn. Laws ch. 644 §§ 52, 53 (repealed 1985). The Minnesota credits appar-
ently were repealed for purposes of a state tax reduction and simplification plan. Telephone interview
with David Cera, Senior Planner for the Minnesota Waste Management Board (Mar. 5, 1986).
128. Runge, supra note 48, at 128.
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plan developed within a broader hazardous waste management scheme,
and upon an institution to carry out the program. The magnitude of the
research effort can also be contingent upon funds obtained through statu-
tory adjustments creating a tax on waste. Ultimately, however, the success
of the entire reduction program relies upon a planning decision that re-
duction is to be a high priority.
CONCLUSION
Federal laws have failed to identify methods of alleviating the source of
the hazardous waste problem-that is, needlessly high levels of production
and disposal-and instead have focused on finding legal solutions after
toxic pollution has already been created. Even with the enactment of the
recent RCRA amendments, the fatal flaw of federal laws continues to be
their failure to provide adequate incentives for waste elimination in a
world ill-equipped to cope with toxic substances safely. Reducing the
threat of hazardous waste is clearly a national priority. Source reduction
legislation, as proposed in this Note,"" is by far the most promising
means available to achieve this end.
129. The legislative proposal for reduction, reuse, and recycling advocated in this Note could be
used selectively to fill gaps in current federal law, or where appropriate, could be enacted in its
entirety as a state package. Ideally, the program should be enacted and initially funded at the federal
level, with responsibility for implementation and a portion of funding delegated to the states upon a
showing of sufficient state capability. This would ensure a national focus for source reduction, while
allowing states the flexibility to design programs suited to their regional needs.
Even under current federal law, RCRA could be interpreted to give EPA the authority to research
source reduction. See supra note 10. To achieve a comprehensive federal program for waste reduction,
however, the other elements of the proposed approach-programs for planning, institutional assis-
tance, and statutory and regulatory adjustments-must be enacted. EPA and Congress should consider
this proposal in response to the RCRA amendments' call for an agency study on the desirability of
"taking other additional [federal] actions" to reduce hazardous waste. See HSWA, supra note 19, at §
224(c).
